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awtonomiya
astigsipedro
ideya at konsepto ng autonomiya sa tripoli agreement (1976), organic act (1989) at final peace agreement (1996)
diskurso ng talaban at kontradiksyon sa paggitan
ng gubyerno at mamamayan ng mindanao (mga moro, mga kristyano at mga lumad sa mindanao)


BAGO NANGYARI ANG SIGALOT

“March 1968, at least 28 Moro army recruits are killed in the Jabidah massacre on Corregidor island, triggering widespread Muslim indignation.” Mahaba ang kasaysayan ng mga mamamayan sa Mindanao sa pagtalima sa pananakop at kolonyalismo, simula pa sa panahon ng Kristyanisasyong Kastila, sa panahon ng Asimilasyong Amerikano, sa mga sumunod neo-kolonyal na mga administrasyon.

The core of this problem is the historical and systematic marginalization and minorization of the islamized ethno-linguistic groups, arguably constituting a Moro nation (bangsamoro), in their own homeland in the Mindanao islands, first colonial powers, Spain, then the US, and more recently by successor Philippine governments dominated by an elite with a Christian-Western orientation. This is the background of the recurrent Moro armed struggle which again manifested itself in the late 1960s an dearly 1970s with the emergence of the MNLF

Hindi simple ang problema sa Mindanao, resulta ito ng ilang daang taong karanasan ng paglaban at pakikibaka para sa sariling kasarinlan. Maging ang kanilang pamamaraan ng paglaban at pagkamit sa hinahangad na kalayaan ay iba-iba din:

Through armed struggle, Islamic diplomacy and peace negotiations, the MNLF was the main vehicle for placing the Moro cause on the national and international agenda. It was also the vehicle for Misuari’s hegemony as the leader of the Moro people. MNLF’s shifting bottom-lines of independence then maximum autonomy under the Tripoli Agreement pursuant to the Moro people’s right to self determination.
Kinukuha ng mga tagapagtatag ng Moro National Liberation front ang pangyayari sa Corregidor bilang signipikanteng insidente at isa sa pinakamahalagang dahilan ng armadong pakikibaka. At kaugnay nito, “the ultimate goal of the MNLF is the complete liberation of the Bangsamoro people and independence of the Bangsamoro homeland. Its claim of a national homeland is primarily through armed struggle. It bannered the Bangsamoro Republik.” Titingnan ng papel ang ideya at konsepto ng autonomiya.

TRIPOLI AGREEMENT 1976

Pagkatapos mabuo, kumuha ng opensiba ang MNLF laban sa gubyerno, isang taon mula ng Jabidah Massacre. Pagkatapos ng ilang taong labanan humantong sa stalemate ang Gubyerno ni Marcos at ang MNLF, nauubusan na ng suplay ng langis ang Pilipinas resulta ng embargo ng mga bansang Muslim na kaaway ng Israel. Gumawa ng paraan ang Organization of Islamic Communities upang mapagkasundo ang Gubyerno ng Pilipinas at ang MNLF sa pamamagitan ng mapayapang paraan. Sa gamit ang diplomasya at pulitikal na mga taktika ni Presidente Marcos, dumulo ang interbensyon ng OIC sa Tripoli Agreement na nilagdaan sa Libya. Ang unang panukala nito ay ang pagtatatag ng autonomiya: “First: The establishment of Autonomy in the Southern Philippines within the realm of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.”
“Strategically, however, the MNLF has reduced its demand to a “genuine political autonomy” for the Bansgamoro homeland within the realm of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippine Republic.” Mula sa radikal na panawagan ng separatismo at magtayo ng sariling estado ng Bangsamoro, napalambot ang pusisyon ng MNLF, nauwi ang panawagan sa paghahanagad ng autonomiya. Ang tanong na lamang ay ano ang saklaw ng itatatag na Autonomous Region sa Mindanao?
“Tripoli talks and agreement in December 1976 – this is the most significant juncture in the whole process because it changed the dispute issue from independence to autonomy, with Tripoli Agreement thereon as the main term of reference henceforth for the next 20 years.” Ang panukala sa Tripoli Agreement ng 1976, ang bubuo ng Autonomous Region ay halos ang kabuang Mindanao. “Second: The areas of the autonomy for the Muslims in the Southern Philippines shall comprise the following:”

Basilan
Sulu
Tawi-tawi
Zamboanga del Sur
Zamboanga del Norte
North Cotabato
Maguindanao
Sultan Kudarat
Lanao del Norte
Lanao del Sur
Davao del Sur
South Cotabato
Palawan

Pero nagkaroon ng mga hindi kasunduan sa interpretasyon at pagbasa ng Tripoli agreement, lumabas na dito ang tunggalian ng interes sa paggitan ng mga Moro na kinakatawan ng MNLF at ang gubyerno ng Pilipinas, na nirerepresenta ni Pangulong Marcos.

“The MNLF was not a party to the process of granting the autonomy. The autonomy was not in accordance with the Tripoli Agreement. And worst of all, the granting was done during a period of peace talks which were supposed to be for the implementation of the agreement.”
Ito ang pusisyon ni Marcos:

And as far as the south is concerned, a plebiscite will be conducted in the thirteen provinces to determine which of them would want to be part of the autonomous region. And he stressed that this is in keeping with the Philippine government position that any settlement in Mindanao must be in full accord with Constitutional process (Philippine Daily Express, 27 Dec. 76.)

Ang gubyerno ng Pilipinas ay umaalinsunod lang di umano sa paragraph 16 ng Tripoli agreement “The Government of the Philippines shall take all necessary constitutional processes for the implementation of the entire Agreement.”
Pero iba ang tingin ni Nur Misuari at ng MNLF:

Nowhere in the Tripoli Agreement is referendum-plebiscite mentioned. The real import of Paragraph 16, Article III of the Tripoli Agreement is to make it mandatory on the part of the Philippine government to rectify and overcome all existing constitutional impediment to conform to the letter and spirit of the Tripoli Agreement. (speech renouncing FM)

“This last minute amendment is perhaps the most important point underlying the agreement – it meant that all the decisions entered into would be subject to rectification by plebiscite. This was Marcos’ ace in his gamble during negotiations.” Signipikante ito sa parte ng gubyerno, nangangahulugan ito ng paggiging awtoritaryan at paggiging pasista ni Marcos sa paraand hindi lantaran, naisahan niya ang MNLF at ang mga moro.
ORGANIC ACT 1989

Hindi naisakatuparan ang lahat ng mga panukala sa Tripoli Agreement nang dahil sa inseridad sa parte ng gubyerno na magdala ng substansyal na kapayapaan sa Mindanao. Noong Pebrero 1986 nag-alsa ang mamamayang Filipino sa EDSA at napatalsik ang Pasistang Presidenteng si Marcos. 1987, nagkaroon ng bagong saligang batas ang Pilipinas, upang maipagpatuloy ang nasimulan sa Tripoli ay gumawa ng kinakailangang mekanismo ang gubyerno ni Presidente Aquino para maisakatuparan ang Tripoli Agreement. “The constitutional commission laid out the specific steps towards the creation of the autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao…”

Sa pamamagitan ng pagtatatag ng Mindanao Regional Consultative Commision na naatasan ng gubyerno na magsagawa ng mga konsultasyon sa Mindanao, partikular ang mga lugar na nakalista sa Tripoli Agreement upang maging batayan ng Organic Act, ang magsisilbing saligang batas ng itatayong Autonomous Region. “…the RCC-MM had twenty million pesos and 150 days within which to come up with a final report.
Ito ang naging kumpusisyon ng komisyon:

In terms of representation by ethnic group, it went as follows: the Muslims were distributed into seven Maguindanao, seven Maranao, six Tausug, two Yakan, two Sama and one convert but married to a Maguindaon; the highlanders were two Subanaen, two Bla-an, one T’boli, one Teduray and one Cuyunon. Yet imbalance among the Muslims may explained by the appointment of at-large commissioners.

Maraming sirkumstanysa ang kumpusisyon ng komisyon na lubhang nakaapekto sa pagsasagwa ng konsultasyon. Hindi nakapagbigay ng final report ang komisyon nang dahil sa internal na tunggalian at oryentasyon.
Kung titingnan, ang Organic Act ng 1989 ay ekstensyon lamang ito ng patuloy na pagbasa at interpretasyon ng mas naunang kasunduan, ang Tripoli Agreement, “History repeated itself during the time of President Corazon Aquino in 1986-1987 with the Philippine constitutional process drafting and ratifying a new constitution running parallel to, and then overtaking, the so-called Mindanao peace talks.”
“This eventually led to the enactment by Congress of an Organic Act for the Autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao (RA 6734) in August 1989. The law covered only four provinces: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-taw. The ARMM was formally inaugurated in Coatabto City in November 1990.” Ganonpaman ay nalagdaan din ang panukalang saligang batas para sa Autonomous Region sa Muslim Mindnanao:
Organic act for the ARMM in august 1989 – republic act no. 6734 was signed into law to implement the constitutional provision and purportedly the Tripoli Agreement. In the ensuing plebiscite in November 1989, only four out of the 13 provinces voted to join the autonomous region.

Ang tanong? Anong pusisyon ng mga Lumad at mga Krsityano sa Autonomiya sa Mindanao, matagal nang panhon nakikibaka ang mga Lumad tulad ng mga Moro, “For most of the past 50 years, Mindanao was “the last frontier.” It was a place where peasant rebels and other losers in the struggle for land in Luzon and Visayas could relocate their dreams for a better life.”
Direktang resulta ng pagsasagawa ng referendum ang paghahati sa opinyon at pagtingen ng mga Lumad, Moro at Kristyano sa Autonomiya. Subalit hindi ang plebisisto ang nagbunsod nito, kundi ang matagal nang kasaysayan ng mga mamamayan na ito sa paghahangad ng kaunlaran at kapayapaan habang kinakaharap ang kolonyalismo. Ang naging silbi ng plebisisto ay mapaigting ang kaibahan ng mga Lumad, Moro at Kristyano sa usapin ng autonomiya, tingnan ang ARTICLE I NAME AND PURPOSE ng Organic Act:
Sec. 2. It is the purpose of this Organic Act to establish the Autonomous Region within the framework of the Constitution and national sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines, and to ensure the peace and equality before the law of all people in the Autonomous Region.

Nangangahulgan ito ng pagpapaloob sa balngkas ng saligang batas ng Republika ng Pilipinas, kung gayon ay mababalewala ang mga customary laws ng mga Moro at Lumad, at mukhang papabor sa mga Kristyano. Sentral ang usapin ng teritoryo at ancestral domain dito, ang mga Moro mismo ang naging minorya sa kanilang tradisyunal na mga terirtoryo. Pansinin ang ARTICLE II ng Organic Act, “Sec. 1. (1) There is hereby created the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, to be composed of provinces and cities voting favorably in the plebiscite called for the purpose, in accordance with Section 18, Article X of the Constitution.”
Nang dahil sa sistematikong pangbabraso at pagtataboy sa mga Lumad at mga Moro sa sarili nilang mga lupa at tradisyunal na mga terirtoryo, mula sa orihinal na 13 na probinsya nakasaad sa Tripoli Agreement, apat probinsya na lamang ang sumang-ayon na mapaloob sa Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. Hindi nabigyan ng solusyon ng pagsasapraktika ng Tripoli Agreement at sa manipestasyon ng mga konsultasyon na naging batayan ng Organic Act ang pagkakawatak-watak ng mga tao sa Mindanao.

Paano maggiging posible ang pinapanukala ng ARTICLE III?:

Sec. 5. The Regional Government shall adopt measures to ensure mutual respect for and protection of the distinct beliefs, customs, and traditions among its inhabitants in the spirit of unity in diversity and peaceful coexistence: Provided, That no person in the Autonomous Region shall, on the basis of creed, religion, ethnic origin, parentage or sex, be subjected to any form of discrimination.


FINAL PEACE AGREEMENT 1996

Sa simula pa lang ay malinaw ang proyekto ni Ramos sa pagkamit ng kaunlaran sa Pilipinas, kaagapay ng kaunlaran sa pamamagitan ng globalisasyon, naging importanteng hakbang ang pagbibigay ng solsuyson sa problema ng Mindanao sa pamamagitan ng usapang pangkapayapan. “President Ramos had a clear vision of what he wanted to do to attain peace in the country, as in Mindanao. He said so in his first State of the Nation address and indicated it unmistakably in the series of subsequent moves he made.”
Dagdag pa: During his term (1992-1998), President Ramos visited Mindanao 50 times, more than the total number of times of all other Philippines presidents before him.”
Mula dito, masasabing instrumental ang interbensyon ni Pangulong Ramos sa pagkamit ng makabuluhang pangkapayapaan, pero kung babalikan ang proyekto ng adminsitrasyon Ramos na pagpapabango ng Pilipinas upang dagsain ng mga banyagang mamumuhunan ang Pilipinas, nagkaroon ng krisis sa pinansya ang mga bansa sa Asya, kinakailangan ang kapayaapan upang mahikayat ang puhunan na pumasok sa Pilipinas at maituloy ang
proyekto niyang globalisasyong dikta ng US at IMF-World Bank. Hindi seryoso ang hangarin ni Ramos, kung kaya pagkatapos ng kasunduan pangkapayapaan sa MNLF, pumasok sa eksena ang Abu Sayyaf. Indikasyon itong hindi pa nabibigyan ng akmang kasagutan ang problema sa Mindanao, nananatili pa ring nakabuyangyang ang Mindanao sa kaguluhan dulot ng kawalang seguridad at atensyon ng gubyerno.
Usapang seguridad at usaping pinansya naman ang katambal na problema ng Autonomous Region:
Towards the end of the process, there was consensus and interim agreement on … issues which constitute the substance of the autonomy. The most contentious of these issues up to the end were in the areas of national defense and regional security (especially the number of MNLF forces for integration into the Philippine military and police) and of revenue sharing (national-regional).

Ang pusisyon ng presidente:

Whereas, the President of the Republic of the Philippines, His Excellency Fidel V. Ramos, has pursued a peaceful settlement of the armed conflict under the principle of peace with honor and to serve the paramount ends of national unity, solidarity and progress for all Filipinos;

Ang pusisyon ng MNLF:
Whereas, the MNLF, led by Professor Nur Misuari, inspired by their quest for peace and prosperity, had in the past asserted the right of the Moro people to freely determine their political status and freely pursue their religious, social, economic and cultural development;

Pero mas mahalaga ay papaano gagawin at isasakatuparan ang napagkasunduan sa Final Peace Agreement sa paggitan ng GRP-MNLF: “But the most contentious issue of the whole negotiations, even more than the substance of the autonomy, was that of the transitional implementing structure and mechanism in relation to the MNLF’s demand for an immediate provisional government and for a territory comprising 13 provinces (and 9 cities therein) pursuant to the Tripoli Agreement.”
Ang kasundaang pangkapayaan ay hindi kasing halaga sa pagpapatupad nito at pagsasapraktika. “The agreement signed in 1996 represents not so much an end to the process – peace and development for the long troubled Southern Philippines – as a means not that end.” Unang hakbang lamang ang kasunduang pangkapayaapaan upang matamasa ng Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao ang substansyal na bunga ng halos wala nang hanggang pakikibaka para sa kapayapaan at kaunlaran.

Phase I shall cover a three (3) year period starting after the signing of the peace agreement with the issuance of Executive Order establishing the Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD), the Southern Philippine Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), and the Consultative Assembly. During this phase, the process of the joining in of MNLF elements with the Armed Forces of the Philippines will start. The joining in of MNLF elements with the PNP as part of the regular police recruitment programme will also take place in this phase.


PAGKATAPOS MANGYARI

Hindi mahirap hanapin sa ngayon ang resulta ng kasunduang pangkapayapaan sa Mindanao, matapos ang makailang rebisyon sa ideya at konsepto ng autonomiya mula sa punto de bista ng mga nag-aalsa at ang reaksyon ng kaakibat nitong administrasyon. Naging dagdag pang kumplikasyon ang iba-ibang pagtanaw ng mga mamamayan sa Mindanao, hindi na ito usapin kung sino ang nauna? Sino ang mas may karapatan? Pero imbis na maghanap ng mga pangako sa hinaharap, bakit hindi maghanap ng maaaring pagkakasunduan sa ngayon? “In conclusion, it bears repeating that other rebel groups negotiating with the government are looking at the implementation of the final peace agreement with the MNLF as a test case. Its success or failure will therefore be a significant variable in the continuing search for peace.”

REFERENCE


Mga Libro
Diaz, Patricio P. Understanding Mindanao Conflict. MindaNews Publication. 2003.

Gaerlan, Kritsina and Mary Stankovitch ed. Rebels, Warlords and Ulama: A Reader on Muslim
Separatism and the War in Southern Philippines. Quezon City Philippines: Institute for Popular Democracy. 2000.

Rodil, BR. Kalinaw Mindnanaw The Story of the GRP-MNLF Peace Process, 1975-1996. Alternate Forum for Research in Mindanao. 2002.

Santos JR., Soliman M. Peace Advocate. 50 Selected Writings, 1986-1997. Dela Salle University Press. 2002.

__________. The Moro Islamic Challenge: Constitutional Rethinking For The Mindanao Peace Process. University of the Philippines press. 2001.

Turning Rage to Courage Mindanao under Martial Law. MindaNews Publication Davao City. 2002.


Mga Journal
Banzon-Bautista, Maria Cynthia Rose, editor. UP CIDS Chronicle: volume 4 number 1-2. Jan-dec. activities of the programs/projects of the Center for Integrative and Developmental Studies. 1999.

Coronel-Ferrer, Miriam. Peace, Conflict Reolsution and Human Rights Occasional Papers. Series no. 94-3 peace building and mediation in the Philippines. UP CIDS. UP Press. 1994.

Mercado JR. Fr. Eliseo and Florendo, Margi Moran. Mindanao on the Mend. Anvil publishing Inc. Manila. 2003.

National Security Review. A Publication of the National Defense College of the Philippines. Volume xx numer 1 1st quarter 2002.

Stankovitch, Mary Issue editor. Accord. An International Review of Peace Initiatives. Compromising on Autonomy Mindanao in Transition. Conciliation Resources London. Issue 6/1999.

The Mindanao Forum. Official Journal of the MSU-Iligan Institute of Technology. Vol. x no. 1 June 1995.

uuwi ako ng nobyembre 25, magkita tayo sa 26 may libro akong ibibigay sayo.

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